Through the case of North Macedonia, I aim to illustrate how Western and Eastern "soft power" seek to establish interest-based dominance, creating an internal vacuum and contradictions.
Is democracy an empty abstraction when the powerful define it, or does its truth lie in the people's concrete responsibility and participation — not in externally imposed labels?
The EU's demands regarding minority protection and linguistic history meet Macedonian claims to ethnic identity. The US NOFO validates Gligorov by criticizing "hate speech laws" and "lawfare" — yet creates a paradox: the NATO-first paradigm ignores the fact that NATO is itself multilateral. Russia observes this tension actively and exploits it. When the US questions the EU's institutional authority, an opening is created for Russian narratives about "EU imperialism." According to Kozhokin, precisely this kind of rhetoric (nationalist, anti-EU, ethno-nationalist) may be exactly the type of narrative that Russian influence operations promote, because it generates friction between Skopje and Brussels — which serves the Kremlin's goal of a fragmented Europe.
(NSS 2025 + State Dept NOFO)
The NSS 2025 and the NOFO represent a genuine ideological shift in American European policy. Whereas previous administrations viewed EU integration as a stabilizing force, this framework regards the EU's supranational structures as potentially democratically undermining. This is not isolated from broader political currents — it reflects a growing skepticism within parts of the US toward international institutions generally.
What makes this relevant to North Macedonia is that the American framework indirectly validates Gligorov's critique. When the NOFO warns of "lawfare" and "excessive hate speech laws," it provides Skopje with a new geopolitical narrative: that EU alignment entails a sacrifice of sovereignty that the US now openly questions. But this is also an oversimplified opposition. NATO — of which North Macedonia remains a member — is itself a multilateral institution with collective obligations, and the United States' own history of linking security cooperation to political expectations is extensive.
The White House document establishes the overarching strategy of "Flexible Realism" — the US will no longer impose democratic reforms on other nations but encourages European allies to reclaim their "national character." Key points:
This constitutes the operationalization of the NSS 2025 strategy through concrete funding:
(Gligorov column + Strasbourg case)
Gligorov's characterization of the EU's demands as "racist and tyrannical" must be understood against the backdrop of North Macedonia's specific path toward membership. Uniquely among candidate countries, the country has been forced into repeated constitutional changes as conditions for accession — the name change through the Prespa Agreement in 2018, and the requirement to incorporate Bulgarian heritage into the constitution through the so-called French proposal of 2022. These demands have not been imposed on other candidate countries to the same extent.
Gligorov's racial discrimination argument is genuinely grounded in law, but Kozhokin's framework provides an important insight: Small states like North Macedonia become battlegrounds between larger powers' diaspora strategies. VMRO-DPMNE's connections to Russian oligarchs are not isolated incidents — they are part of Kozhokin's documented strategy of using the diaspora as a "proxy" for the Kremlin.
What makes this relevant to North Macedonia is that the American framework indirectly validates Gligorov's critique. When the NOFO warns of "lawfare" and "excessive hate speech laws," it provides Skopje with a new geopolitical narrative: that EU alignment entails a sacrifice of sovereignty that the US now openly questions.
Paradox: Gligorov argues for "NATO-first" to protect Macedonian sovereignty. Yet according to Kozhokin, precisely this kind of rhetoric (nationalist, anti-EU, ethno-nationalist) may be exactly the type of narrative that Russian influence operations promote, because it generates friction between Skopje and Brussels — which serves the Kremlin's goal of a fragmented Europe. As previously analyzed, the NSS 2025 represents an ideological shift toward "Flexible Realism." But Kozhokin offers us perspective: Russia observes this tension actively and exploits it. When the US questions the EU's institutional authority, an opening is created for Russian narratives about "EU imperialism."
(Kozhokin/RISI + Scribd document)
Russia has clear political ties to North Macedonia, primarily through VMRO-DPMNE. According to, among others, the Warsaw Institute and the European Parliament Research Service, Moscow has conducted hybrid threat activities since 2016 — disinformation, cyber intrusions, and alleged covert financing — aimed at blocking NATO accession and the Prespa Agreement. Leaked embassy documents describe a "subversive propaganda and intelligence operation" originating from the Russian embassy. Russian businessman Sergey Samsonenko and the Greek-Russian oligarch Ivan Savvidi have been linked to influence operations. VMRO-DPMNE's nationalist rhetoric coincides with Russian narratives about Slavic solidarity and anti-Western sovereignty, although the party formally pursues a Western orientation. When Gligorov now argues for "NATO-first, EU aside," this aligns suspiciously closely with Moscow's strategic interests.
RISI's Strategy (under Kozhokin):
The Scribd Document's Recommendations:
Kozhokin's Contribution to Understanding: He reveals that diaspora politics is strategic, not sentimental. It is not about protecting Russian-speaking populations — it is about creating "human infrastructure" for geopolitical objectives. The Balkans are particularly valuable because:
These three tensions interact in complex ways:
The American shift toward skepticism of the EU increases North Macedonia's room for maneuver to challenge EU demands. Yet simultaneously, Russian diaspora networks create incentives to pull the country closer to the Kremlin's sphere. Gligorov's "NATO-first" argument may be genuinely patriotic — or it may inadvertently coincide with Russian strategic interests.
The paradox: If North Macedonia pursues a sober sovereignty policy in line with the US NOFO, it risks falling into a geopolitical vacuum where Russian soft power fills the void. EU conditionality, despite its flaws, offers institutional protection against external influence operations.
The deepest conflict is not between two, but between three models:
North Macedonia stands at the crossroads of these three imperatives. The choice will determine not only Skopje's future, but which model will come to dominate the Balkans in the decades ahead.