Sweden stands at a crossroads. The election in three weeks will determine whether we build a society founded on community and solidarity — or whether we allow ourselves to be governed by fear of the future and political actors who prioritize their own power over their fellow human beings. But there is a dimension to this discussion that receives too little attention: how foreign power actors actively seek to shape the Swedish debate by disseminating narratives that serve their interests, not ours.
Recently it has come to light that Ulf Kristersson, current Prime Minister, Conservative, and his talking points on migration issues — particularly regarding Ceuta — resemble arguments that benefit Russia. This is no random phenomenon. Professor Evgeny Kozhokin, a former officer in Russia's foreign intelligence service SVR, describes in a confidential document from December 2025 how Moscow actively works to influence the political discourse in Europe through the diaspora and other channels. The purpose is clear: to weaken European cohesion and democracy.
At the same time, a new program has been launched by the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. The program "Developing Civilizational Bonds, Democratic Resilience, and Rule of Law in Europe" offers between 1 and 3 million dollars per project to organizations working on issues of national sovereignty, migration, and Western identity — precisely the same issues that dominate Swedish political debate today.
What these two initiatives — the Russian and the American — have in common is that they both target the same fissures in society. They focus on migration, freedom of expression, the EU's supranational structure, and what they call "national sovereignty." These are exactly the issues that have created polarization in Sweden in recent years.
The Russian strategy, according to Kozhokin's document, categorizes target groups into three segments: the loyal, the pragmatists, and the oppositional. Each group receives different treatment — from deeper cultural and political engagement to limited surveillance. The American NOFO program is less subtle but targets the same fundamental questions: who gets to define what "Western identity" means? Whose interpretation of democracy shall prevail?
Both campaigns share an ideological position that runs counter to Swedish tradition. The Social Democratic approach has always been that Sweden grows stronger when we lift each other up — not when we create enemy images and emphasize differences. As Olof Palme stated in his 1965 radio address on immigrants: "People's skin color, race, language, and place of birth have nothing to do with human qualities." Prejudice, Palme argued, always has its roots in everyday life — in the workplace and in the neighborhood. It grows in ignorance of other people's differences and in fear of losing one's position. It is precisely that fear which foreign actors are now seeking to amplify.
Why are these foreign efforts problematic for democracy? Because they undermine the ability of Swedish voters to make decisions based on our own interests and values, not on the geopolitical agendas of other nations.
When we discuss migration in Sweden, it is not about abstract concepts like "civilizational self-confidence" or "natural rights." It is about real people — about children seeing their parents go to work and earning a wage they can live on. About young people feeling seen and needed, not recruited into criminality because they feel excluded.
Magdalena Andersson, former Prime Minister, Social Democrat, expressed it in her election victory speech on August 9: "It's about building an entire strong society. About all children seeing both their parents go to work." That is what is at stake when foreign actors try to shape our debate. They do not want to see a Sweden that builds security through community — they want to see a Sweden that is easier to influence by creating division.
The party program states that Social Democracy aims to "shape a society where all people have the will, the opportunity, and the obligation to contribute to the common good." Solidarity, it states, "grows from the insight that we are all dependent on each other." It is this insight that stands in stark contrast to the catalog of demands now being exported into Swedish debate from both Moscow and Washington.
The most troubling aspect of foreign influence is that it is not always visible and deliberate. The most dangerous influence is the kind we carry without knowing it — the kind that sneaks into the political conversation, shifts what is considered reasonable to say, and redefines how we describe society's problems.
When Swedish politicians repeat talking points about Ceuta that happen to coincide with Russian interests, it does not necessarily mean they are knowingly taking orders from the Kremlin. But it shows how narratives that serve foreign power actors can enter Swedish debate, be redirected, and appear as domestic positions. Kozhokin's document describes exactly this: how pragmatists in the diaspora seek "reliable consular assistance and clear information" but at the same time, without themselves being politically engaged, carry forward a rhetoric that ultimately serves Moscow's purposes. The mechanism is the same in Swedish politics: arguments echo from various directions and are amplified by social media algorithms, which the Social Democratic organizational analysis describes as "the algorithms of a few tech giants driving an increasingly polarizing societal debate."
The American NOFO program works in a similar but more structured way. By offering significant sums to civil society organizations working on migration and freedom of expression within an ideological framework formulated by the U.S. State Department, an infrastructure is created where specific interpretations of these issues receive financial backing and visibility. As the analysis of Section C concludes: DRL will "co-develop workshops and events, select participants, determine training topics and locations." This is not passive support — it is active involvement in shaping the content of the European debate.
The indirect influence occurs when ordinary citizens, journalists, commentators, and politicians step into an already existing narrative without reflecting on where it comes from. They adopt arguments that seem reasonable in the moment — about EU bureaucracy, mass migration, the limits of freedom of expression — without recognizing that the arguments have been formulated within an ideological framework designed to serve other countries' interests.
The party program warns that "anti-democratic movements exploit racist prejudices to create division and pit people against each other." When local democratic presence weakens, as stated in the organizational document, "the field is left open for populist forces." Foreign actors know this. They know that gaps in local democratic presence are precisely the openings they can exploit.
Magdalena Andersson articulated in Oskarshamn the core that must be defended: "Sweden became Sweden because we lifted each other. That we rejoiced in each other's successes, supported each other when times were tough, and also managed to see the best in each other." It is this trust — trust between citizens, trust that society will carry us collectively — that both Russian and American influence ultimately seeks to break down. A society marked by distrust is easier to steer from the outside.
If we recognize that influence comes from two directions — east and west — the conclusion is that Sweden cannot stand alone. National sovereignty in the rhetoric of both the Kremlin and the U.S. State Department is not an offer of independence. It is an invitation to dependency — to letting great powers define our problems for us. The truly sovereign choice is to stand united with our European partners.
On migration, this means that Sweden stands united with the EU and Spain for common, humane, and orderly solutions. Spain has firsthand experience of how migration challenges can be exploited geopolitically — Ceuta and Melilla are places where Russia has actively spread narratives to create division within the EU. When Swedish politicians repeat the same talking points, unwittingly or wittingly, the European unity that is our collective line of defense against foreign influence is undermined.
The party program is clear: Social Democracy "considers it self-evident to take shared responsibility with other countries and peoples in Europe and in the rest of the world." It emphasizes that "international solidarity and a principled commitment to peace, common security, and disarmament are fundamental to the labor movement." It is in that tradition that we must approach the migration issue — not by importing conflicts or fear, but by building European cohesion.
When Magdalena Andersson says that "we will hold together against all forces that seek to divide us," this applies not only domestically. It also applies to the external forces that, through influence campaigns, funded programs, and algorithm-driven flows, seek to shape how we view each other and the future. Solidarity — between citizens and between nations — is the strongest antidote we have against that development.
The election on September 13 is therefore not just about wallets, welfare, and security. It is about national integrity. Shall we allow ourselves to be shaped by the interests of foreign powers? Or shall we choose a path built on the needs of the Swedish people, European cooperation, and the principle of the equal worth of all human beings?
We believe in solidarity. We believe in community. We believe that Sweden is strongest together with Europe — not alone on the margins of great power games. That is the path we take, and that path we must defend.
Kozhokin's SVR Report: Source and metadata available via OC-Media: https://oc-media.org
DN — Kristersson and Ceuta: https://www.dn.se/ledare/ulf-kristersson-fortsatter-att-upprepa-talepunkterna-om-ceuta-till-kremls-lycka/
SVD — Kristersson, Forssell, and Migration Chaos: https://www.svd.se/a/d4G8LX/ulf-kristersson-johan-forssell-risk-for-nytt-migrationskaos-om-oppositionen-tar-over-i-sverige
U.S. NOFO — Developing Civilizational Bonds, Democratic Resilience, and Rule of Law in Europe: Opportunity number DFOP0019307, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State. Application portal: https://www.grants.gov